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“ We shall not cease from exploration, and the end of all our
exploring will be to arrive where we started and know the place
for the first time.”
—T.S. Eliot1
I. GERRYMANDERING AND THE SINGLE-MEMBER DISTRICT:
THE COMPLEXITY OF THE PROBLEM
Charming and irresistible as it is, the nineteenth-century slang
term “gerrymander”2 cannot generate an equal protection standard
to transform congressional and state legislative redistricting in the
twenty-first century. The problem is that the word, which first
appeared in the Boston Gazette on March 26, 1812, referred to the
expansive artistic liberties taken by Governor Elbridge Gerry in
redrawing a Massachusetts State Senate district for a partisan ally.3
A cartoon lampooning the serpentine shape of the district quickly
cemented in public consciousness the definition of a “gerrymander”
as a district outlandishly drawn by politicians to serve partisan pur-
poses.4 Ever since, the critics of “partisan gerrymandering” (some-
thing of a redundancy) have treated the bizarre shape of districts
not only as the hallmark of manipulative districting, but also as
the essential injury inflicted by politicians on the people in reconsti-
tuting the mechanics of representation.5
But the pervasive critique of byzantine cartography is strik-
ingly superficial as both political and constitutional analysis.
While strange-looking districts may be one of the signs of partisan
1. T.S. ELIOT, Little Gidding, in FOUR QUARTETS 49, 59 (1971) (1942).
2. Emily Barasch, The Twisted History of Gerrymandering in American Politics, ATLAN-
TIC (Sept. 19, 2012), http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2012/09/the-twisted-history-
of-gerrymandering-in-american-politics/262369/#slide2 [https://perma.cc/D2VV-7XXN]; Kristi
Keck, History Has Drawn Skewed Image of the Father of ‘Gerrymandering,’ CNN (Feb. 26,
2010, 9:24 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2010/POLITICS/02/26/profile.gerrymandering/ [https://
perma.cc/UAZ4-D74M]. 
3. See Barasch, supra note 2; Keck, supra note 2.
4. See Barasch, supra note 2; Keck, supra note 2.
5. See, e.g., Christopher Ingraham, America’s Most Gerrymandered Congressional Dis-
tricts, WASH. POST. (May 15, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2014/05/
15/americas-most-gerrymandered-congressional-districts/?utm_term=.be71375b516d [https://
perma.cc/6LYQ-Y46T] (“The compactness of a district—a measure of how irregular its shape
is, as determined by the ratio of the area of the district to the area of a circle with the same
perimeter—can serve as a useful proxy for how gerrymandered the district is.”).
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manipulation of political consent, they do not themselves constitute
an intrinsic or essential injury against democratic rights. Aestheti-
cally appealing and graciously drawn legislative districts are not
only rare in the United States, but they are also unlikely to be of
any superior quality in terms of enhancing the values that really
matter in democratic politics.6 To focus exclusively on district line
aesthetics is to miss the real story.
What matters from a democratic standpoint in congressional (and
state and local legislative) electoral systems is not better-looking
cartography or drawing districts into geometric shapes that children
can recognize, but (1) the ultimate representativeness of the body of
legislators elected to represent all the people of the state in Con-
gress (or their other legislative assemblies); and (2) the competi-
tiveness of the elections by which candidates reach office. Of these
two intertwined but often conflicting goals, representativeness is the
more fundamental and important because the whole purpose of
elections is to promote effective representative democracy. Compet-
itiveness is a subsidiary value because it is useful primarily in
promoting the election of representatives who are motivated to
faithfully serve and respond to the people. Thus, the more an elec-
toral design engenders comprehensive and effective representative
politics for all citizens, the more democratic it is.
Seen through this lens, single-member districting constitutes a
serious democratic disappointment even under the most attractive
circumstances—that is, even when the district perimeters are
gracefully and compactly drawn by independent commissioners who
have not a partisan bone in their bodies. Single-member districts
register poorly on the representativeness scale because huge num-
bers of people supporting the political minority party in a single-
member district routinely end up with no member of Congress that
they voted for or feel any political affinity toward. In a time of in-
tense polarization like today, a single-member district guarantees
6. See Dustin G. Mixon, Stop Criticizing Bizarrely Shaped Voting Districts. They Might
Not Be Gerrymandered After All, CONVERSATION (Nov. 30, 2017, 7:41 PM), http://theconver
sation.com/stop-criticizing-bizarrely-shaped-voting-districts-they-might-not-be-gerryman
dered-after-all-86510 [https://perma.cc/WM4V-AE8R] (arguing that mathematical models
show that badly misshapen districts can produce less gerrymandered results under the right
circumstances).
3
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massive frustration and disaffection among constituents belonging
to the losing party.
Imagine a state with nine congressional districts and a 55% Re-
publican majority evenly spread across the state. Republicans will
be able to win against all Democratic opponents in every single dis-
trict. That means that 45% of the people across the state will end up
with 0% of the seats, while the party of 55% of the people will cap-
ture 100% of them.
This scenario illustrates the central flaw of winner-take-all
single-member districts. These districts are great at facilitating rep-
resentation of partisans who have been drawn—whether purpose-
fully or not—into the majority position, but they are terrible at
incorporating and representing the voice of partisans who have been
drawn into the minority position. Moreover, the lack of representa-
tiveness in the resulting congressional delegation will be accom-
panied by a lack of competitiveness in each district: the 55% versus
45% margin creates a ten-point advantage that is virtually impos-
sible for the minority party to overcome (situations like this exist in
many states).
Furthermore, engineering more competitive congressional dis-
tricts (which is tough to do given the politically cohesive nature of
most American communities) does not make them more represen-
tative. Indeed, as districts become more competitive, they become
less representative in general. For example, if the statewide par-
tisan breakdown in the hypothetical state above were a 52 to 48%
split instead of a 55 to 45% split, each district would become more
competitive: there would be a more exciting campaign and a smaller
ultimate margin of victory for candidates in the general election.
But in terms of representativeness, this closer partisan balance
means that 3% more of the people will be left without a representa-
tive that they actually supported. The most competitive congressio-
nal district in the country, one where an election is decided by a
single person’s vote, effectively leaves half the population without
a representative of choice. Although society acts as if ending par-
tisan gerrymandering would promote representativeness and com-
petitiveness at the same time, under the system of single-member
districting, these goals are actually in significant conflict.7
7. Indeed, designing the hypothetical district with something like seven 65 to 35%
4
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The creation of extraordinarily precise redistricting software over
the last three decades has dramatically improved the scientific ex-
actitude of gerrymandering.8 But the software has not changed the
essential art of the practice, which is simple and second-nature to
effective party leaders operating in winner-take-all single-member
district regimes: packing, cracking, and stacking.9 Pack as many of
the opponent party’s voters as you can into as few districts as
possible while creating reliably safe (but not wastefully lopsided)
majorities for the ruling party’s candidates in all of the other dis-
tricts; stack narrow but invulnerable majorities on top of large mi-
norities; and, crack any natural majority districts for the opposition
into splintered pieces.10
This familiar decennial state-based practice of the party in
power—maximizing at all costs its share of U.S. House seats in the
state’s congressional delegation—is the name of the game in most
of America. The large swing state of Ohio provides a striking ex-
ample of how a party in power can gerrymander its way to a lop-
sided advantage over its competitors. Although President Barack
Obama carried Ohio in both 2008 and 2012, Republican leaders in
Akron drew themselves a startling twelve-to-four seat advantage in
the state’s sixteen congressional districts, stuffing huge Democratic
majorities into a handful of districts while handing Republicans a
decisive edge in all the rest.11
Republican leaders in North Carolina, enjoying their historic
takeover of the legislature in 2010, have used the same formula to
Republican districts and two 80% Democratic districts would reverse the priority of the goals
in this hypothesis (that is, prioritizing competitiveness). These districts would be far more
representative now because more of the voters (including a lot more Democrats) would be able
to cast a vote for a winner, but the districts would become completely noncompetitive. The
more representative they become, the less competitive they become. 
8. See Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952, 961, 963 (1996) (plurality opinion); see also Sam Wang,
The Great Gerrymander of 2012, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 2, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/02/
03/opinion/sunday/the-great-gerrymander-of-2012.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0 [https://perma.
cc/YL55-EGJF].
9. See, e.g., KENNY J. WHITBY, THE COLOR OF REPRESENTATION: CONGRESSIONAL BE-
HAVIOR AND BLACK INTERESTS 114-15 (1997) (describing use of the methods of packing, crack-
ing, and stacking in racial gerrymandering)
10. See, e.g., id.
11. See Sabrina Eaton, In Evenly Split Ohio, Redistricting Gives GOP 12-4 Edge in Con-
gressional Seats, CLEVELAND.COM (Nov. 11, 2012, 9:00 PM), http://www.cleveland.com/open/
index.ssf/2012/11/in_evenly_split_ohio_redistric.html [https://perma.cc/XG63-APGP].
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demolish their opponents’ position. In a state carried by Obama in
the 2008 presidential election, the Republicans expertly drew
themselves a “super-majority partisanship advantage in 10 of 13
House districts,” a brazen plan in which “10 districts have a
Republican partisanship of between 57% and 64%, while 3 districts
have a packed partisanship of 69% to 77% Democratic.”12 In 2012,
50.6% of North Carolina voters voted for a Democrat for Congress,
and yet Democrats captured less than one-third of the state’s U.S.
House seats.13
In Virginia, a state that has in recent elections sent two Demo-
crats to the United States Senate and Democrats to the governor-
ship and to every other statewide constitutional office, and a state
that President Obama carried in both 2008 and 2012, Republican
leaders in Richmond have drawn seven safe U.S. House seats out of
eleven, creating a lopsided seven-to-four majority for the minority
party in the state’s U.S. House delegation.14 Across the Potomac
River, the same kind of dynamic is at work in Maryland (a state
with a Republican governor), where Democrats now enjoy, after the
2012 redistricting, a seven-to-one advantage in the state’s House
delegation, a ratio far beyond the actual partisan proportions of the
state’s voters.15 In Virginia, a Republican minority has gerryman-
dered the Democratic majority into near oblivion; in Maryland, a
Democratic majority has gerrymandered the Republican minority
into near oblivion.
One might defend the regime of single-member districting on the
theory that it at least advances majority rule, but this is significant-
ly and demonstrably false. Because the districts are so manipulable,
12. FAIR VOTE, 2014 ELECTIONS IN NORTH CAROLINA 1 (July 2014), https://visionpdf.com/
2014-elections-in-north-carolina.html [https://perma.cc/LV5J-CMCZ].
13. See Wang, supra note 8.
14. Aaron Blake, Could GOP Grab Control of Redistricting in Virginia?, WASH. POST (Jan.
31, 2011, 12:05 PM), http://voices.washingtonpost.com/thefix/mapping-the-future/could-gop-
grab-control-of-redi.html [https://perma.cc/A8XD-LYNY]; Tarini Parti, Fighting Red Maps in
Purple States, POLITICO (Jan. 4, 2015, 8:54 AM), https://www.politico.com/story/2015/01/
fighting-red-maps-in-purple-states-113932 [https://perma.cc/QQ6J-3S82].
15. David Hill, Maryland: A Lonely State for Republicans, WASH. TIMES (Nov. 8, 2012),
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2012/nov/8/maryland-a-lonely-state-for-republicans/
[https://perma.cc/BEQ3-BUS5]; Brian Witte & Meredith Somers, Maryland Governor to Push
for Redistricting Reform, WASH. TIMES (Feb. 4, 2015), http://www.washingtontimes.com/ news/
2015/feb/4 /maryland-governor-to-push-for-redistricting-reform/ [https://perma.cc/CE9U-
LJEW]. 
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they can easily be drawn to convert a statewide popular-vote minor-
ity into a congressional delegation majority that produces serious
distortions at the national level,16 an effect seen in Virginia or
Pennsylvania.17 Across America in 2012, Republican state leaders
redrawing congressional districts acted so effectively with new ger-
rymander software that Republicans captured a thirty-three vote
majority (234-201) in the U.S. House of Representatives despite the
fact that 1.36 million more Americans voted for Democratic candi-
dates in congressional elections that year.18 Amazingly, the combi-
nation of the structural flaws of single-member districts with the
extremist vices of strategic partisan gerrymandering has thwarted
majority rule in some states, fair minority representation in most
states, and national majority rule in Congress.
II. JUDICIAL PARALYSIS: WHY THE SUPREME COURT HAS NOT BEEN
ABLE TO SOLVE THE PROBLEM OF GERRYMANDERING
Unless the Supreme Court embraces a standard of proportional
representation, the problem of the partisan gerrymander is ulti-
mately intractable and unsolvable. There may be a way to solve the
most extreme cases (demonstrated in the next Section), but most
partisan gerrymanders will remain untouched until the Supreme
Court defines a proportional representation standard as a consti-
tutional requirement.
The mathematical logic for proportional representation (60% of
the voters in a state should end up with 60% of the seats in their
congressional delegation and 40% of the voters should end up with
40% of the seats) is compelling indeed, and it flows right out of the
one-person, one-vote principle.
16. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
17. See Analysis Indicates Partisan Gerrymandering Has Benefited GOP, ASSOCIATED
PRESS (June 25, 2017, 4:07 PM), https://wtop.com/author/the-associated-press/ [https://perma.
cc/WC34-CBZA].
18. See David Daley, How the GOP Made Your Vote Useless, DAILY BEAST (Oct. 7, 2017,
12:01 AM), https://www.thedailybeast.com/how-gop-gerrymandering-made-your-democratic-
vote-useless [https://perma.cc/R7CX-DNUJ].
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Baker v. Carr19 and Wesberry v. Sanders20 established the central
precept that there have to be equal numbers of voters in a state’s
congressional districts so that each citizen’s vote counts the same as
all the others. This “radical equation” is rooted in the fertile En-
lightenment soil of political equality and the “consent of the gov-
erned,” as Jefferson put it in the Declaration of Independence.21
Rousseau famously argued that each person in a democracy has 1/N
of the political sovereignty, where N is the population.22 It follows
that groups of elected officials, who legislate on behalf of voters,
must wield a proportion of legislative power roughly equal to the
proportion of voters who support them. Any failure to translate a
party’s share of the vote into the party’s share of the seats breaks
the circuit of democratic equality, agency, and representation.
The idea that citizens should have a right to see that the political
party whose candidates they vote for actually collects a proportion-
ate share of congressional and legislative seats in the state has a
brilliant provenance in democratic political theory. John Stuart
Mill argued:
In a really equal democracy, every or any section would be
represented, not disproportionately, but proportionately ....
Unless they are, there is not equal government, but a govern-
ment of inequality and privilege: one part of the people rule over
the rest: there is a part whose fair and equal share of influence
in the representation is withheld from them, contrary to all just
government, but, above all, contrary to the principle of democ-
racy, which professes equality as its very root and foundation.23
Proportional representation regimes advance both representa-
tiveness and competitiveness at the same time. Every vote, wheth-
er for the majority party candidate or minority party candidate,
counts toward enlarging the chosen party’s representative share.
19. 369 U.S. 186, 187-95 (1962) (holding claim that vote dilution violates the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is justiciable).
20. 376 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1964) (striking down a Georgia statute diluting votes of citizens in a
single district because the “Constitution intends that when qualified voters elect members of
Congress each vote [should] be given as much weight as any other vote”).
21. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
22. JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, THE SOCIAL CONTRACT 14-19 (Jonathan Bennett ed., 2017).
23. JOHN STUART MILL, CONSIDERATIONS ON REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT ch. VII
(Project Gutenberg ed. 2013) (1861).
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This means that there are, theoretically at least, no wasted votes (or
many fewer), and it means that every party will have an incentive
to fight for every vote, and every citizen will have an incentive to
turn out to vote.
To be sure, proportional representation is not perfect and there
are abundant and complex practical questions as to how and when
to translate John Stuart Mill’s proportionality principle into the
cycles and mechanics of American congressional politics. But these
logistical problems need not detain this principle because no Justice
has ever endorsed a proportional representation standard under
equal protection principles. Rather, quite the opposite has occurred,
as the Court explicitly and decisively rejected this proposition in
City of Mobile v. Bolden,24 Davis v. Bandemer,25 and Vieth v. Jube-
lirer.26
Thus, nearly three decades after the Supreme Court called par-
tisan gerrymandering unconstitutional in Bandemer, still no one
can define it, agree on how to distinguish illegitimate partisan ger-
rymandering from legitimate partisan redistricting, or specify what
objective standards should be imposed on legislators charged with
placing voters into districts. In 2004, the Vieth plurality simply gave
up the ghost. Writing for the Vieth plurality, Justice Antonin Scalia
lamented “[e]ighteen years of judicial effort with virtually nothing
to show for it”27 and rejected Justice Byron White’s Bandemer
framework—that partisan gerrymanders can be dismantled by the
courts when plaintiffs show “both intentional discrimination against
an identifiable political group and an actual discriminatory effect on
that group”28—as hopelessly ambiguous, totally unmanageable in
practice, and essentially incoherent.
Justice Scalia thus declared partisan gerrymander claims to be a
nonjusticiable political question29 within the meaning of the canon-
ical Baker v. Carr criteria, holding that no judicially “discernable”
and “manageable” standards had emerged to manage such claims
under the Equal Protection Clause or Article I (Sections 2 or 4) of
24. 446 U.S. 55, 75-76 (1980) (plurality opinion).
25. 478 U.S. 109, 118-27 (1986).
26. 541 U.S. 267, 288 (2004) (plurality opinion).
27. Id. at 281. 
28. Id. (quoting Bandemer, 478 U.S. at 127).
29. Id. at 277-81.
9
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the Constitution.30 He proceeded to eviscerate with logical rigor and
his characteristic lacerating sarcasm all the different puffy stan-
dards for adjudicating partisan gerrymanders: those advanced in
Bandemer by Justices Byron White31 and Lewis Powell;32 those ad-
vanced in Vieth by dissenting Justices John Paul Stevens,33 David
Souter,34 and Stephen Breyer,35 who threw desperate hail-Mary
passes to rescue the whole effort; and by Justice Anthony Kennedy,
who held out in his Vieth concurrence the possibility that one day an
answer might magically appear.36
Justice Scalia and his side have definitely gotten the better of
the Justices who have tried to supply the missing standards for
defining and overthrowing invidious partisan gerrymanders. The
basic problem is that, in the real world of American politics defined
by winner-take-all single-member districts, all legislative redis-
tricting has vivid and well-understood partisan consequences and
all political redistricting is, in essence, partisan gerrymandering.
The Court has long recognized and allowed redistricting’s funda-
mentally partisan character. As Justice White stated in his Bande-
mer concurrence, “As long as redistricting is done by a legislature,
it should not be very difficult to prove that the likely political con-
sequences of the reapportionment were intended.”37
Given this fundamental political reality, the doctrinal challenge
since Bandemer has been to figure out when partisanship in the
30. Baker set out a six-part test to define when a case seeks to answer a “political
question.” 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962). A case involves a political question when there is a
question that is: (1) “a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a
coordinate political department”; (2) “a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable
standards for resolving it”; (3) impossible for courts to decide without making “an initial policy
determination of a kind clearly for non-judicial discretion”; (4) impossible for courts to
independently resolve “without expressing lack of respect due [to] coordinate branches of
government”; (5) “an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision already
made”; or (6) if answered, potentially embarrassing due to “multifarious pronouncements” on
the one question by various departments. Id. It is the second criterion that has bedeviled the
partisan gerrymander discussion because no one can divine “discoverable and manageable
standards” for defining and correcting the partisan gerrymander. See id.
31. See Vieth, 541 U.S. at 281-84 (plurality opinion).
32. See id. at 290-91.
33. See id. at 292-95.
34. See id. at 295-98.
35. See id. at 299-301.
36. See id. at 301-05.
37. Bandemer, 478 U.S. at 129 (plurality opinion).
10
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process goes too far, or when a partisan redistricting map is too
strange-looking, or when the resulting makeup of a legislative body
(as in the Indiana House of Representatives in Bandemer 38 ) is too
unfair and disproportionate. This is an overwhelmingly difficult and
seemingly arbitrary task. With his razor-like instinct for puncturing
loose subjective standards like these (that is, when he is not endors-
ing them himself, as he did in the analogous racial gerrymandering
cases39), Justice Scalia pounces whenever the Justices on the other
side rely on vague language to this effect, as they all necessarily do.
Although we do not need to revisit his painful takedown of each
Justice’s pet theory, Scalia’s failsafe rhetorical strategy informs this
cogent and typical critique of one part of Justice Souter’s five-part
standard for divining an illicit partisan gerrymander:
Like us, Justice Souter acknowledges and accepts that “some
intent to gain political advantage is inescapable whenever
political bodies devise a district plan, and some effect results
from the intent.” Thus, again like us, he recognizes that “the
issue is one of how much is too much.” And once those premises
are conceded, the only line that can be drawn must be based, as
Justice Souter again candidly admits, upon a substantive
“notio[n] of fairness.” This is the same flabby goal that deprived
Justice Powell’s test of all determinacy. To be sure, Justice
Souter frames it somewhat differently: Courts must intervene,
he says, when “partisan competition has reached an extremity of
unfairness.” We do not think the problem is solved by adding the
modifier.40
If we accept the fact that partisanship saturates the redistricting
process, informs the design of single-member district maps, and af-
fects the ultimate composition of our legislative bodies, as all of the
Justices clearly do, then there can be no principled or coherent way
to say when the process has gone too far for the requirements of the
Equal Protection Clause or Article I. To say that things have gone
too far would imply that there is a normative equal protection
38. See id. at 113 (majority opinion).
39. See generally Jamin B. Raskin, The Supreme Court’s Racial Double Standard in
Redistricting: Unequal Protection in Politics and the Scholarship That Defends It, 14 J.L. &
POL. 591 (1998).
40. Vieth, 541 U.S. at 298 (plurality opinion) (alteration in original) (citations omitted).
11
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standard for defining what a fair constitutional redistricting plan is,
but that is assuredly not the case. As Justice Scalia taunts Justice
Souter, “Justice Souter’s proposal is doomed to failure for a more
basic reason: No test—yea, not even a five-part test—can possibly
be successful unless one knows what he is testing for.”41
Justice Scalia is right about this. If the Court were to dive back
into Justice Frankfurter’s “political thicket”42 now to slay the mon-
ster of partisan gerrymandering, it would be without a compass,
without a map, and without a weapon. All fancy multipart tests to
the side, the Justices would have to fall back on a seductive but
theoretically empty aesthetic-appearances analysis that dwells on
the beguiling spectacle of “bizarre” district lines and contorted
district shapes. But the obsessive focus on district aesthetics, as we
have seen, is a massive distraction from the important substantive
issues of representativeness and competitiveness.43 Moreover, even
if the Court successfully defined ugliness, and struck down ugly
districts produced by partisan gerrymandering, they would only be
replaced by pretty districts produced by partisan gerrymandering.
There is a glimmer of hope coming from the Court in the Justices’
decision to uphold independent redistricting commissions in Arizo-
na State Legislature v. Arizona Independent Redistricting Commis-
sion,44 yet this should not be deemed a panacea given the inherent
unfairness that single-member districting creates on the whole. If
the constitutional test of unfairness of the redistricting thicket is
going to turn on some notion of extremism in gerrymandering, what
will extreme gerrymandering mean and how will we recognize it?
III. A DEFINITION OF TWO TYPES OF EXTREME GERRYMANDERING:
MINORITY USURPATION AND FENCING OUT
What legislatures need is a definition of extreme partisan ger-
rymandering that is based on neither a comprehensive proportion-
al representation standard (which no Justice is prepared to accept
as a constitutional requirement today), nor a subjective aesthetic-
41. Id. at 297.
42. Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549, 556 (1946).
43. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
44. 135 S. Ct. 2652, 2659 (2015).
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appearances “you know it when you see it” standard, which is hope-
lessly vague and unworkable.
The key to managing a conceptual breakthrough is to take the
states’ U.S. House delegations seriously as component parts of
functional American political and constitutional democracy. These
delegations are woven both textually and subtextually into the
federal constitutional regime, and they have played significant for-
mal and informal institutional roles in American politics, both on
Capitol Hill and in their home states.45
When thinking about the states’ congressional delegations meet-
ing in Washington, as they represent the people of their states and
legislate, two extreme problems come into focus that will define the
worst partisan gerrymanders. The first problem—“usurping the
majority”—occurs when state legislative leaders are able to flip a
minority of popular votes for Congress in statewide elections into a
majority of seats in the state’s congressional delegation through
expert gerrymandering, including through the familiar stand-by
practices of packing, stacking, cracking, and shacking.46 The second
problem—“fencing out”—occurs when majority party leaders in the
legislature not only gerrymander to deprive the minority party of a
number of seats in the state’s U.S. House delegation proportional to
their statewide vote, but also go so far as to deny them even a single
seat in the delegation (a seat to which they would be entitled by vir-
tue of having enough support to reach at least the so-called “thresh-
old of exclusion,” that is, they have drawn at least one-third of the
votes in a state with four seats).47
Viewing the redistricting process through this prism, this Article
will define extreme partisan gerrymandering as: (1) usurping the
majority, when party leaders use their control over the redistricting
process to convert a partisan minority in the statewide popular vote
for Congress into a U.S. House delegation majority; and (2) fencing
out, when party leaders run the table and completely freeze out the
opposition party which should be entitled, proportionally speaking,
to at least one seat, if not more, in the state’s U.S. House delegation.
45. See U.S. CONST., art. I, § 2, cl. 3.
46. Samuel Issacharoff & Pamela S. Karlan, Where to Draw the Line?: Judicial Review of
Political Gerrymanders, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 541, 551-52, 551 n.45 (2004).
47. See infra note 73.
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To address these two problems, this Article proposes two clear
and workable constitutional solutions that venture beyond the
Equal Protection Clause by deploying a Twelfth Amendment an-
alysis, in the case of the minority usurping the majority, and a First
Amendment analysis, in the case of fencing out. These mostly un-
mined and unexamined doctrinal fields are fertile for identifying
new approaches to attacking insider manipulation of the democratic
political will.48
A. Minority Usurpation Gerrymanders
Should the partisan majority of voters for Congress be able to ob-
tain a majority, or at least half, of the seats in a state’s U.S. House
delegation? Does this idea follow from the one-person, one-vote prin-
ciple or any other constitutional provision?
48. Benisek v. Lamone, which is presently pending before the U.S. Supreme Court, is the
first case to reach the Court based on allegations that partisan gerrymandering violates the
First Amendment. 266 F. Supp. 3d 799, 818-19 (D. Md. 2017) (three-judge court), argued, No.
17-333 (U.S. Mar. 28, 2018). In the underlying case, Shapiro v. McManus, the U.S. District
Court for the District of Maryland held that a First Amendment claim challenging redis-
tricting was justiciable and actionable should the plaintiff adequately allege and prove that
[(1)] those responsible for the map redrew the lines of [the] district with the
specific intent to impose a burden on [the voter] and similarly situated citizens
because of how they voted[; (2)] to establish the injury [of vote dilution], the
plaintiff must show that the challenged map diluted the votes of the targeted
citizens to such a degree that it resulted in a tangible and concrete adverse
effect[; and (3)] the plaintiff must allege causation—that, absent the mapmakers’
intent to burden a particular group of voters by reason of their views, the
concrete adverse impact would not have occurred.
203 F. Supp. 3d 579, 596-97 (D. Md. 2016) (three-judge court). However, the court noted that
“the State can still avoid liability by showing that its redistricting legislation was narrowly
tailored to achieve a compelling government interest.” Id. at 597. Additionally, the dissent
disagreed that the First Amendment claim was workable because the Supreme Court’s prior
tolerance for partisanship in districting creates intractable line-drawing problems, and courts
are poorly equipped to determine unusual circumstances in which “redistricting inflicts an
actual, measurable burden on voters’ representational rights.” Id. at 601 (Bredar, J.,
dissenting).
Furthermore, on January 9, 2018, a three-judge panel in the U.S. District Court for the
District of North Carolina struck down a North Carolina congressional redistricting plan on
First Amendment, Equal Protection Clause, and Article I grounds, and ordered that the
districts be redrawn in advance of the 2018 midterm elections. Common Cause v. Rucho, No.
1:16-CV-1026, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5191, at *248 (M.D.N.C. Jan. 9, 2018) (three-judge
court). On January 18, 2018, the Supreme Court issued a stay on the order. Order in Pending
Case, Rucho v. Common Cause, 138 S. Ct. 923 (2018) (No. 17A745).
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To begin with, it should be obvious that frustrated partisan voters
who assert a right to have the majority in their state’s U.S. House
delegation cannot win this claim on the mere basis of favorable
statewide party registration figures. After all, registered Democrats
can (and do) vote for Republican candidates in the general election
and vice versa, and Independent and minor-party voters also have
a right to participate and potentially swing the general election.
Thus, party registration figures should be irrelevant because party
registration cannot be confused with the actual exercise of deliber-
ate political will.
However, if a majority of voters in a state actually cast their
ballots for U.S. House candidates from the Democratic Party, but in
the same election, gerrymandering produces a House delegation ma-
jority for the Republicans, then the cause of action becomes com-
pelling and viable indeed. This result is not because of a generalized
proportional representation requirement, which few scholars, much
less jurists, are prepared to read into equal protection at this point,
but rather because of the specific details and operation of a part of
the Constitution that has not yet been brought to bear on the ger-
rymander controversy: the Twelfth Amendment.
Under the Twelfth Amendment, a state’s congressional delegation
has an important constitutional function and status.49 The Amend-
ment, which spells out procedures for electing the President of the
United States, calls upon each state’s U.S. House delegation to act
as a single voting unit if no majority forms in the electoral college.50
Then, the President must be chosen by the participants in a so-
called “contingent election” in the U.S. House of Representatives.51
The Twelfth Amendment is explicit about this procedure. Before the
entire Congress, the President of the Senate must count the elec-
toral votes cast for presidential candidates and then
if no person have such majority, then from the persons having
the highest numbers not exceeding three on the list of those
voted for as President, the House of Representatives shall choose
immediately, by ballot, the President. But in choosing the
49. See U.S. CONST. amend. XII.
50. See id.
51. Michael J. McGee, Avoiding a Corrupt Bargain: Ensuring Congress Is Kept Out of a
Contingent Presidential Election, 52 U. LOUISVILLE L. REV. 345, 353-54 (2014).
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President, the votes shall be taken by states, the representation
from each state having one vote.52
This unit voting procedure for the states in a contingent presi-
dential election in Congress has urgent but as-yet unexamined con-
stitutional significance in designing redistricting rules for the
composition of a state’s U.S. House delegation. If a state’s electoral
procedures allow 47% of the people of a state to control 60% of the
state’s congressional delegation while 53% of the voters end up with
only 40% of the U.S. House seats, it means that the congressional
representatives of the popular minority will control the state’s
presidential vote in a contingent election, and the state’s popular
majority will be effectively shut out of having a say in who the next
president will be. If leaders of the minority party succeed in
usurping the majority, they will have effectively thwarted majority
rule under the Twelfth Amendment, which requires the state’s
congressional delegation, speaking as one, to represent the will of
the people of the state in weighing in on who will become President
of the United States.
When the Twelfth Amendment was passed, the Founders had an
idealistic view of the House of Representatives as the people’s
house.53 John Adams had recently described the goal of the House
as being “in miniature, an exact portrait of the people at large.”54
Elbridge Gerry would not sign the redistricting bill that gave rise to
the term “gerrymander” for another thirty-six years.55 In the mean-
time, before the Founders passed the Twelfth Amendment, in all
but six states electors were appointed by the state legislature rather
than through the popular vote.56 By locating prospective contingent
elections in the House of Representatives, this provision of the new
Twelfth Amendment represented an attempt to improve a failed
process arising from an undemocratic, elitist, and manipulative
52. U.S. CONST. amend. XII (emphasis added).
53. See generally THE FEDERALIST NOS. 52-57 (Alexander Hamilton or James Madison),
NO. 58 (James Madison) (discussing the people’s interest in the House of Representatives and
its functioning).
54. JOHN ADAMS, Thoughts on Government, reprinted in 4 PAPERS OF JOHN ADAMS 86, 87
(Robert J. Taylor et al. eds., 1979).
55. See Barasch, supra note 2.
56. CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY, INC., CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY’S GUIDE TO U.S.
ELECTIONS 254 (John L. Moore ed., 2d ed. 1985).
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method of choosing the executive. The idea was to bring presiden-
tial elections much closer to the actual will of the people. It would
be a fitting and triumphant vindication of the Twelfth Amendment
if it were to help this deadlocked nation dislodge the tyranny of the
entrenched partisan gerrymander in congressional elections.
What is important to see about the possibility of lawsuits by
voters challenging minority usurpation of their states’ congressional
delegations is that they will be rare. Consider the following ex-
ample. In 2014, there was only one state where state legislative
leaders had effectively flipped the script and engineered minority
party usurpation, and that was Michigan.57 In that year, some
50.9% of Michiganders cast their ballots for Democrats for the State
House and 48.9% voted for Republicans.58 But, through the miracle
of gerrymandering in the computer age, Republicans captured an
astounding nine of the state’s fourteen U.S. House seats, leaving the
densely-packed Democrats the remaining five.59 This means that a
majority of voters in Michigan voted for Democratic candidates for
Congress, but Republicans won two-thirds of the House seats.60
Thus, it would be fairly straightforward for Michigan’s Demo-
cratic voters and candidates to bring a lawsuit alleging and proving
minority usurpation of the state’s congressional delegation (and
presidential contingent election voting) by an extreme partisan ger-
rymander. Indeed, Democrats in Michigan recently did so in League
of Women Voters of Michigan v. Johnson, although the plaintiffs
based the challenge in First Amendment and Equal Protection
Clause violations.61 Regardless, if the courts agreed that this map
was intended to create, and resulted in, an unconstitutional ger-
rymander of the majority into a minority, they could order the
57. See Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 3, League of Women Voters of
Mich. v. Johnson, No. 2:17-cv-14148-DPH-SDD, 2017 WL 6610622 (E.D. Mich. Dec. 12, 2017)
[hereinafter Complaint].
58. See id. at 18.
59. See id. In the 2016 election, Republicans in Michigan garnered 50.5% of the votes cast
for the House of Representatives, but did not increase the number of seats they held,
maintaining nine of the state’s fourteen seats. See id. at 17. More to the point, in two districts
packed with Democratic voters, the Democratic candidates received in excess of 75% of the
votes tallied. See 2016 Michigan House Election Results, POLITICO (Dec. 13, 2016, 1:57 PM),
https://www.politico.com/2016-election/results/map/house/michigan/ [https://perma.cc/ V6Z3-
ZW8R].
60. See Complaint, supra note 57, at 18.
61. See id. at 30, 32.
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Michigan legislature to devise a revised plan before the 2018 mid-
term election that would assure that Democrats would have a fair
opportunity to capture at least half of the state’s fourteen House
seats. This could be accomplished through the old-fashioned and
excruciating method of conducting prolonged hearings and negoti-
ations over single-member district lines, or it could be accomplished
relatively easily and efficiently through the adoption of a propor-
tional representation mechanism, such as cumulative voting or
ranked choice voting.62 Either way, under the Twelfth Amendment
and the complementary one-person, one-vote principle, the congres-
sional delegation must be left in the hands of representatives se-
lected by a majority of voters.
However, the Michigan example should not leave the impression
that minority usurpation is completely aberrational. If this cause of
action had been in place in 2012, voters in five states could have
brought lawsuits attacking statewide gerrymanders that reversed
the public will and thwarted the popular vote. In Arizona, Republi-
cans had 52.9% of the votes for Congress but won only four seats,
while Democrats had just 42.7% but picked up five seats.63 In
Michigan, Republicans again won nine seats with only 45.65% of the
vote, while Democrats won five with nearly 51% of the vote.64 In
North Carolina, Republicans captured a remarkable nine seats with
48.5% of the vote, while Democrats ended up with four seats despite
having collected 50.6% of the vote.65 In Pennsylvania, which may be
62. See Fair Representation, FAIRVOTE, http://www.fairvote.org/fair_representation#what_
is_fair_voting [https://perma.cc/B788-4GNQ] (displaying FairVote’s descriptions of the dif-
ferent voting systems).
63. Data on file with author. See Election 2012—Arizona, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 2012), https://
www.nytimes.com/elections/2012/results/states/arizona.html [https://perma.cc/5Z4G-C784]
As noted before, Arizona Republicans challenged the constitutionality of the Arizona Indepen-
dent Redistricting Commission, which the U.S. Supreme Court upheld. Ariz. State Legislature
v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm’n, 135 S. Ct. 2652, 2658 (2015). Republicans presently hold
four out of nine congressional delegation seats in Arizona; Democrats hold five; and one re-
mains vacant after Republican Trent Franks resigned in 2017. See Directory of Representa-
tives, U.S. HOUSE REPRESENTATIVES, https://www.house.gov/representatives#state-alabama
[https://perma.cc/JB6M-YGFW].
64. See Complaint, supra note 57, at 17-18.
65. Data on file with author. See Election 2012—North Carolina, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 2012),
https://www.nytimes.com/elections/2012/results/states/north-carolina.html [https://perma.cc/
W4V7-D2Z8]. North Carolina Democrats initiated a lawsuit, the outcome of which (at the time
of this writing) has required that new maps be drawn in advance of the 2018 midterm elec-
tions. See Common Cause v. Rucho, No. 1:16-CV-1026, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5191, at *250-
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the most striking case in the country, Republicans took thirteen
seats with only 48.77% of the vote while, Democrats were left with
five seats after collecting 50.28% of the popular vote.66 Finally, in
Wisconsin, Republicans claimed five seats with 48.92% of the vote,
while Democrats ended up with only three based on 50.42% of the
vote.67
In all of these cases, the courts should have been able to order a
statewide redistricting or voting system remedy that would reverse
the naked political usurpation that had taken place and likely re-
store the majority of voters to their rightful place within their
state’s U.S. House delegation. Indeed, the gerrymanders in Wiscon-
sin68 and North Carolina69 have already been deemed unconstitu-
tional by the lower courts, and the Wisconsin case, Gill v. Whitford,
is currently pending before the Supreme Court.70 The key point is
that a state’s congressional delegation cannot be gerrymandered
and flipped by a usurping minority in advance of a presidential
election. The Twelfth Amendment analysis makes clear that gerry-
mandering of a popular majority into a legislative minority is not
merely a representational harm on the legislative side, but a direct
51 (M.D.N.C. Jan. 9, 2018) (three-judge court).
66. Data on file with author. See Election 2012—Pennsylvania, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 2012),
https://www.nytimes.com/elections/2012/results/states/pennsylvania.html [https://perma.cc/
RV2V-QN3P]. In December 2017, a Pennsylvania state court issued a Recommended Findings
of Fact and Conclusions of Law, holding that although it has been shown that partisan ger-
rymandering has resulted in a significant imbalance of party representation in the state con-
gressional delegation (Republicans have held thirteen of the eighteen seats since the 2011
redistricting plan was implemented), the petitioners “failed to meet their burden of proving
that the 2011 [redistricting] plan ... clearly, plainly, and palpably violate[d] the Pennsylvania
Constitution.” Recommended Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law at 46, 48, 49-50, 126-
27, League of Women Voters of Pa. v. Commonwealth, No. 261 M.D. 2017 (Pa. Commw. Ct.
Dec. 29, 2017) [hereinafter Recommended Findings of Fact]. In January 2018, the Penn-
sylvania Supreme Court ruled the 2011 plan unconstitutional after finding that the partisan
gerrymandering that occurred in 2011 and resulted in a significant imbalance of party
representation in the state congressional delegation “clearly, plainly and palpably violate[d]
the Constitution of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania.” See League of Women Voters of Pa.
v. Commonwealth, 175 A.3d 282 (Pa. 2018) (per curiam). In February 2018, the court issued
an opinion further delineating the reasons for its January order. See League of Women Voters
of Pa. v. Commonwealth, 178 A.3d 737 (Pa. 2018).
67. See Election 2012—Wisconsin, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 2012), https://www.nytimes.com/
elections/2012/results/states/wisconsin.html [https://perma.cc/5VXH-U6T2].
68. See Whitford v. Gill, 218 F. Supp. 3d 837, 843 (W.D. Wis. 2016) (three-judge court),
argued, No. 16-1161 (U.S. Oct. 3, 2017).
69. See Common Cause, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5191, at *248.
70. See Gill v. Whitford, 137 S. Ct. 2268 (2017) (mem.).
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threat to popular control of a state’s participation in a contingent
presidential election as well.
B. Fencing Out the Minority Party in the Congressional Delegation
An even more egregious gerrymandering violation takes place
when a majority party in a state legislature “runs the table” and
effectively “fences out” any representation of the minority party in
the state’s U.S. House delegation when the numbers justify its
receiving at least one seat.71 The constitutional sin here relates not
to participating in presidential elections under the Twelfth Amend-
ment, but rather to the delegation’s expressive political functions as
the representative body of the people of the state. Completely fenc-
ing out a major partisan current of opinion creates a dramatic and
compelling case of political viewpoint discrimination under First
Amendment doctrine.
Completely excluding the minority party from representation in
a state’s congressional delegation is a surprisingly common feature
of American congressional politics today. To begin with, we must
recognize—but then dismiss—seven small states which send only a
single member to the U.S. House of Representatives.72 This political
shut-out is a melancholy fact of life for Republicans in Vermont and
Democrats in Wyoming, but it is based purely on population and the
reapportionment process, not partisan discrimination. Thus, these
states are irrelevant to the fencing out analysis, although they do
help to clarify what is so wrong with shut-out arrangements in the
larger states.
Of primary interest are the ten states where one party has
completely fenced the other one out from the congressional dele-
gation despite the fact that the minority party’s vote total in House
elections surpasses the so-called “threshold of exclusion” and, thus,
is deserving of at least one House seat.73 In several cases, the
71. The phrase “runs the table” comes from pool when a player sinks all of the balls on the
first turn before the other player even gets a chance to shoot. The evocative and apposite
phrase “fencing out” comes from the Supreme Court’s decision in Carrington v. Rash. 380 U.S.
89, 94 (1965) (holding that Texas could not fence out military personnel from registering to
vote and participating in state politics based on political predictions of how they might vote).
72. Alaska, Delaware, Montana, North Dakota, South Dakota, Vermont, and Wyoming
only have one Representative. See U.S. HOUSE REPRESENTATIVES, supra note 63.
73. Edward Still & Pamela Karlan, Cumulative Voting and the Voting Rights Act,
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zeroed-out minority party would be due more than one seat under
basic principles of fairness and proportionality.74
There are six Republican states—Arkansas, Idaho, Kansas, Ok-
lahoma, Utah, and West Virginia—where legislative leaders have
run the table and fenced out Democrats from Congress; there are
four Democratic states—Connecticut, Hawaii, Massachusetts, and
Rhode Island—where party leaders have entirely fenced out Repub-
licans.75 In all of these cases, the excluded party surmounted the
“threshold of exclusion,” meaning that it garnered enough popular
votes to justify receiving at least one seat (and perhaps more) in the
state’s congressional delegation.76 The largest minority vote showing
in 2014 from a vanquished party was by Republicans in Connecti-
cut, who drew 41.5% of the vote and ended up with zero out of five
seats.77 On a proportional theory, they should have been entitled to
two seats, but were instead shut out completely.
The most dramatic wipeout took place in Massachusetts where
Democrats in 2014 captured all nine U.S. House seats in a state
that simultaneously elected a Republican Governor, Charlie Ba-
ker.78 In fact, six of Massachusetts’s congressional districts in 2014
had no Republican in the race at all,79 driving down the number of
voters who voted for Republicans by taking away their ability to do
so. This steady downward and corrosive pressure on minority par-
ties reinforces and entrenches majority party control. Democrats
now have a lock on every seat in Massachusetts, while more than
half a million Massachusetts voters who prefer Republicans have no
representation reflecting their votes anywhere in the state’s con-
gressional delegation.
The following tables list all the states where the majority party
has run the table and fenced out the political opposition from the
FAIRVOTE, http://archive.fairvote.org/?page=418 [https://perma.cc/4FHC-RFFK] (discussing
the “threshold of exclusion” in electoral systems).
74. See id.
75. See U.S. HOUSE REPRESENTATIVES, supra note 63.
76. See infra Tables 1-3.
77. See infra Tables 1-3.
78. See Election 2014—Massachusetts Election Results, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 17, 2014, 12:28
PM), https://www.nytimes.com/elections/2014/massachusetts-elections [https://perma.cc/R2JQ-
G397].
79. See id.
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state’s congressional delegation, leaving voters of the minority party
effectively voiceless in Congress:
Table 1. 2012 Fence-Out States80
State R Votes D Votes Elected
AR* 61.5% 29.5% 4R
CT 34.1% 64.9% 5D
ID 64.0% 32.8% 2R
KS*± 62.7% 23% 4R
ME 38.4% 61.6% 2D
MA* 33.5% 62.1% 9D
NE 64.7% 35.3% 3R
NH 45.5% 49.9% 2D
OK 64.6% 30.9% 5R
RI 39.3% 55.7% 2D
Note: The states marked with an (*) included one or more uncontested House races,
meaning that even more voters would have voted for the minority party statewide
had they even had the opportunity to do so. The states marked with a (±) reflects
a total percentage of the vote at less than 95% of total votes in the state based on
votes cast for independent/non-major-party candidates.
80. Data on file with author.
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Table 2. 2014 Fence-Out States81
State R Votes D Votes Elected
AR* 56.3% 34.9% 4R
CT 39.2% 59.8% 5D
ID 63.2% 36.8% 2R
KS 62.7% 36.2% 4R
MA* 39.8% 57.8% 9D
OK* 70.2% 26.7% 5R
RI 38.9% 610.1% 2D
UT 62.3% 33.5% 4R
WV 55.3% 41.5% 3R
Note: The states marked with an (*) included one or more uncontested House races,
meaning that even more voters would have voted for the minority party statewide
had they even had the opportunity to do so. The states marked with a (±) reflects
a total percentage of the vote at less than 95% of total votes in the state based on
votes cast for independent/non-major-party candidates.
Table 3. 2016 Fence-Out States82
State R Votes D Votes Elected
AR*± 71.2% 10.4% 4R
CT± 36.2% 63.1% 5D
ID 65.7% 30.7% 2R
KS*± 59.6% 33.1% 4R
MA*± 20.8% 72.6% 9D
NE 58.9% 39.4% 3R
NH± 44.9% 47.7% 2D
OK* 68.9% 26.9% 5R
RI 33.6% 62.6% 2D
UT 64.1% 32.1% 4R
WV 64.9% 32.7% 3D
Note: The states marked with an (*) included one or more uncontested House races,
meaning that even more voters would have voted for the minority party statewide
had they even had the opportunity to do so. The states marked with a (±) reflects
81. Data on file with author.
82. Data on file with author.
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a total percentage of the vote at less than 95% of total votes in the state based on
votes cast for independent/non-major-party candidates.
Based on this data, in 2014 alone, there were over three million
voters nationally whose views should have been reflected and rep-
resented somewhere in their state’s delegation but were nowhere to
be heard or found.83 Those are citizens who have the right to influ-
ence public policy through their votes but who, as a practical matter,
cannot have any say at all even if indirectly through a member of
Congress elected from a different district in their state. Their effec-
tive exclusion from representation is a consequence of the invisible
but systematic nullification of district lines that leaders of the other
party have deliberately drawn around them.
IV. PARTISAN VIEWPOINT DISCRIMINATION IN THE STATE’S
STRUCTURING OF ITS CONGRESSIONAL DELEGATION
The fencing-out process is seriously problematic under the First
Amendment when we recognize that congressional delegations sent
to Washington are an essential forum for core political expression,
debate, and representation.
Our constitutional system forbids the viewpoint-based suppres-
sion of political speech in any public speech forum, especially when
the viewpoint suppression completely cancels out an entire school
of thought. It is “axiomatic that the government may not regulate
speech based on its substantive content or the message it conveys,”84
and targeting specific political viewpoints for exclusion from a public
forum is a type of speech censorship “all the more blatant” and the
most “egregious form of content discrimination.”85 Political view-
point discrimination is the cardinal official sin in government-struc-
tured speech forums.
83. See supra Tables 1-3. When the vote tallies noted above are aggregated, more than
three million people voted in the fence-out states and their votes did not result in congres-
sional representation.
84. Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 828 (1995) (holding that
the University of Virginia could not have a policy of reimbursing the costs of all student
publications except those with a religious perspective or point of view). 
85. Id. at 829.
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It goes without saying that discriminating against people because
of their political party affiliation is the bull’s-eye center of view-
point-based speech discrimination. The Supreme Court established
this principle in cases striking down the time-honored but invidious
governmental practice of firing and hiring employees on a partisan
basis (in non-policymaking jobs).86
The hard question is whether a state’s congressional delegation
actually constitutes a public speech forum of any of the three rec-
ognized types (traditional, designated, and nonpublic)87 such that it
should be impermissible for state actors—that is, state legislators
engaged in the act of redistricting—to deliberately drive out any
representative from the other party who seeks to participate and
speak in it. In both traditional and designated public fora, the gov-
ernment may not make any content-based or viewpoint-based
exclusions without showing that they are narrowly drawn to ad-
vance a compelling state interest; in nonpublic fora, which are the
most easily controlled by official state managers, government can
make reasonable content-based exclusions and selections, but such
discrimination may never be based on political viewpoint.88
A state’s congressional delegation obviously does not qualify as a
“traditional public forum,” an effectively closed category which in-
cludes streets, sidewalks, and parks.89 These are the places where
the modern free speech struggle of labor unionists first took place in
the 1930s90 and which have been treated, at least by an act of ju-
dicial imagination, as sites of wide-open expression traditionally
86. See Rutan v. Republican Party of Ill., 497 U.S. 62, 65 (1990) (holding that government
employers may not base hiring and promotion decisions on party affiliation); Elrod v. Burns,
427 U.S. 347, 373 (1976) (plurality opinion) (striking down the firing of Republican employees
of the sheriff ’s office by the new Democratic sheriff and holding that public employment
outside of high-ranking policymaking positions may not be conditioned on party membership
or political belief). Justice Stevens noted that point in his dissenting opinion in Vieth v.
Jubelirer. See 541 U.S. 267, 324 (2004) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“[U]nless party affiliation is
an appropriate requirement for the position in question, government officials may not base
a decision to hire, promote, transfer, recall, discharge, or retaliate against an employee, or to
terminate a contract, on the individual’s partisan affiliation or speech.”).
87. See, e.g., Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 829-30; Int’l Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc.
(ISKCON) v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 678-79 (1992).
88. See, e.g., Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 829-30; ISKCON., 505 U.S. at 678-79. 
89. See, e.g., Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983).
90. See generally Hague v. Comm. for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496, 518-32 (1939) (Stone, J.,
concurring) (discussing impermissible government interference with labor unions’ peaceful
assembly and distribution of literature).
25
Raskin: Taking the States' Congressional Delegations Seriously: A Twelfth
Published by William & Mary Law School Scholarship Repository, 2018
152 WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW ONLINE [Vol. 59:127
“devoted to assembly and debate.”91 Nor is a state’s congressional
delegation a “designated public forum,” which is to say public
property, like meeting rooms in a state university92 that the state
has deliberately “opened for expressive activity by part or all of the
public.”93 A congressional delegation does not qualify as a desig-
nated forum because the state has not desired it to be “generally
open” to speakers coming from the public.94 Only the tiniest sliver
of the American people gets to participate as members in a state’s
congressional delegation—far less than .001%.95
Therefore, if a congressional delegation is to be any kind of speech
forum, it must be a “nonpublic forum,” the kind of government-cre-
ated speech arena in which the state exercises considerable control
and grants only selective access to a certain handful of individual
speakers and positions rather than general access to all.96 In non-
public fora, the state can restrict the number of speakers and the
number and type of subjects to be discussed, but it may never dis-
criminate based on speakers’ political viewpoint.97
The state’s congressional delegation, which is the essential mech-
anism for the people of a state to express themselves on federal
91. Perry Educ. Ass’n, 460 U.S. at 45; see also Schneider v. Irvington, 308 U.S. 147, 160
(1939). These seminal cases destroyed the concept that Justice White advanced in Davis v.
Massachusetts that government officials could exclude the public from speaking on Boston
Common and other publically owned properties because a private owner could exclude the
public from comparable properties that were privately owned. 167 U.S. 43, 46-47 (1897).
Instead, the Court held that the title to public places like streets and parks had “immemo-
rially” been held in trust by government for speech communication by citizens. Hague, 307
U.S. at 515-16.
92. In Widmar v. Vincent, the Court recognized that a state university had created a des-
ignated public forum for student groups by effectuating a policy opening its meeting facilities
up to the student body. 454 U.S. 263, 267-68, 267 n.5 (1981).
93. ISKCON, 505 U.S. at 678.
94. Id. at 267-68.
95. See, e.g., Shapiro v. McManus, 203 F. Supp. 3d 579, 586-87 (D. Md. 2016) (three-judge
court) (explaining that the state legislature approved a congressional district plan created by
only five individuals for the eight representatives of Maryland, each which represents over
721,000 citizens). Additionally, dividing the total number of members of Congress by the to-
tal U.S. population equals a percentage of 0.00016. See QuickFacts—United States, U.S. CEN-
SUS BUREAU, https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/fact/table/US/PST045217#viewtop [https://
perma.cc/N88Y-QFYU] (estimating the U.S. population at 325,719,178 as of July 1, 2017);
Members of Congress, GOVTRACK, https://www.govtrack.us/congress/members [https://perma.
cc/9AME-JUPY] (noting there are currently 100 senators and 435 representatives in Con-
gress).
96. See Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 805-06 (1985).
97. Id. at 806.
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policy questions, should definitely be classified as a nonpublic forum
in which a state-imposed political viewpoint censorship screen is
impermissible. A state’s congressional delegation has all of the nec-
essary features of a “nonpublic forum.” A congressional delegation
is a select and rarified body, which is what makes it “nonpublic,” but
the delegation is also a critical “forum,” perhaps the critical forum,
for political expression and discussion. As a body operating in
Washington, the delegation speaks for the people of its state in the
U.S. House of Representatives in multiple contexts relating to
budget and taxes, criminal justice policy, environmental protection,
international trade and business regulation, election law, war and
peace, and so on.98 Conversely, when at home in the state, the con-
gressional delegation speaks for the U.S. House of Representatives
to the people, with its members explaining to the public the pro-
cesses of the House and reporting on its deliberations and de-
cisions.99
Moreover, a state’s congressional delegation is itself the site of
intense discussion and debate as members continually caucus about
the state’s legislative priorities, spending requests, funding for-
mulas, logrolling ventures, and institutional House strategy. The
congressional delegation must also act as a cohesive unit in Twelfth
Amendment contingent presidential elections,100 and its members
play a critical role in decennial redistricting by communicating the
delegation’s views to state legislative leaders to influence the fate of
their districts and political careers.
The Court has recognized nonpublic fora in everything from the
Combined Federal Campaign charity drive101 to the publication of
public high school newspapers,102 a public school’s internal mailbox
system,103 and government-sponsored and televised congressional
98. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
99. See, e.g., Eli Watkins, How to Find Town Hall Meetings, CNN (Feb. 10, 2017, 5:34
PM), https://www.cnn.com/2017/02/10/politics-town-hall-location-congress/index.html [https://
perma.cc/97UU-AMM8] (demonstrating a method through which federal legislators interact
with constituents).
100. See supra notes 49-52 and accompanying text.
101. Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 802-06.
102. Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 262, 267-70 (1988) (holding evidence
failed to demonstrate school officials intended to make the student newspaper a public forum). 
103. Perry Educ. Ass’n. v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 39, 45-49 (1983).
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candidate debates.104 Indeed, it is the Supreme Court’s decision in
Arkansas Educational Television Commission v. Forbes, the case
about the exclusion of congressional candidates from political
debates organized by a state-run cable network,105which clearly
indicates that a nonpublic forum analysis is an illuminating way to
think about the structuring of a state’s congressional delegation.
The Court’s discussion of political viewpoint discrimination estab-
lishes the specific grounds for finding that a state’s deliberate use
of the redistricting process to completely suppress the political voice
of the opposition imposes an impermissible viewpoint-based dis-
crimination in a nonpublic forum.106
In Forbes, a state-owned public television broadcaster staged a
congressional candidate debate but excluded from it “an independ-
ent candidate with little popular support.”107 Justice Anthony Ken-
nedy found that public broadcasting ordinarily “does not lend itself
to scrutiny under the forum doctrine” but that a state government’s
officially-organized “candidate debates present the narrow exception
to the rule.”108 A debate such as this one—although not itself a fixed
place like a park, a sidewalk, or a school—is treated as a public
forum for two significant reasons. First, “the debate was by design
a forum for political speech by the candidates.”109 Second, the Court
found that “in [its] tradition, candidate debates are of exceptional
significance in the electoral process.”110
These characteristics of a First Amendment nonpublic forum are
present in the creation, structure, and function of a state’s congres-
sional delegation. Each state’s congressional delegation, formed
through the electoral process and itself crucial to the governmental
process, is by design a forum for political speech, and it is the kind
of political speech that goes right to the heart of government policy-
making. Further, a congressional delegation is also of continuing
and “exceptional significance” to politics111—not only for the elec-
toral process involving Congress, but also for the electoral process
104. Ark. Educ. Television Comm’n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666, 669 (1998).
105. Id.at 669-71.
106. Id. 673-74.
107. Id. at 678, 669, 682.
108. Id. at 675.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. See id.
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involving the President, and for government policy formulation
itself.
Although the Forbes Court found that the occasion of a state-
sponsored congressional candidate debate is definitely a nonpublic
forum, it also held that the maverick and perennial Independent
candidate Ralph Forbes was not unlawfully excluded from it.112 The
test is whether “the exclusion of a speaker from a nonpublic forum”
is “based on the speaker’s viewpoint” or is otherwise not “reason-
able.”113 The majority found that Forbes was not excluded because
of “objections or opposition to his views,” but rather because “he had
generated no appreciable public interest.”114 Specifically, voters and
news media “did not consider him a serious candidate,” he had
“little, if any, financial support,” his headquarters was his house,
and he described his own campaign organization as “bedlam” and
his public visibility through the media as “zilch.”115 Significantly,
Justice Kennedy explained that the State did not “exclude Forbes
in an attempted manipulation of the political process.”116 He also
cited the fact that Forbes’s exclusion was “not the result of political
pressure.”117
This analysis is clarifying and helpful for the analysis of partisan
gerrymandering as a means to exclude Republicans or Democrats
from a state’s congressional delegation. When majority party leaders
in a state, like Democrats in Massachusetts118 or Republicans in
Arkansas,119 set about to squelch the voices and presence of congres-
sional candidates from the opposition party in the state’s congressio-
nal delegation, it is obviously “based on the speaker[s’] viewpoint”120
and because of “objections or opposition”121 to their partisan views
and position. In the vast majority of cases of expert gerrymandering,
major-party candidates who, unlike Forbes, have indeed generated
112. Id. at 669, 683.
113. Id. at 682.
114. Id.
115. Id. 
116. Id. at 683.
117. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
118. See supra notes 78-79 and accompanying text.
119. See supra note 75 and accompanying text.
120. Ark. Educ. Television Comm’n, 523 U.S. at 682.
121. Id.
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“appreciable public interest”122 are the players involved. And, unlike
the refusal to include the presumably hopeless candidacy of the
gadfly Mr. Forbes, the exclusion of Republicans from the Massachu-
setts congressional delegation or Democrats from the Arkansas con-
gressional delegation is a form of discrimination that targets serious
and substantial political forces representing millions of people.
Whatever the merits of the Forbes decision with respect to the ex-
clusion of a fringe candidate from a two-party debate sponsored by
the government, fencing out the other party in a redistricting is all
about “manipulation of the political process”, and it is indisputably
the direct “result of political pressure.”123
In sum, when a state legislature deliberately redistricts in such
a way as to completely nullify the voice of the major opposition party
in the state’s congressional delegation, it constitutes an impermissi-
ble viewpoint-based discrimination and exclusion from an essential
nonpublic forum. This forum is surely more important than a poorly
watched congressional candidate debate on cable television or a low-
visibility charitable fundraising drive.
The natural remedy follows from the nature of the violation: the
courts must send the faulty redistricting back with orders to pursue
either a redrawn map or new voting systems that will permit the
minority party to climb the fence and win at least one seat. As long
as the fenced-out party can demonstrate from the most recent vote
totals that it proportionately could have and should have won at
least one seat, then judicial relief should compel the state to develop
new district lines or adopt a new voting system that will facilitate
the election of at least one congressman or woman from the minority
party. The courts clearly have the power to break up this falsely
engineered regime of political silence and conformity by integrating
the congressional delegation across party lines.
V. BACK TO THE THICKET? THE SUPREME COURT, REDISTRICTING,
AND DEMOCRATIC PROGRESS
The Supreme Court has undertaken two major constitutional
forays into the storied “political thicket” of reapportionment and
122. Id.
123. Id. at 683 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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redistricting. Both journeys related to America’s original sin: racism
and white supremacy. The first was an historic triumph that sets
the standard for any judicial effort to resolve the partisan gerry-
mander conundrum. The second was a doctrinal disaster and poli-
tical failure of the first order. What we learn from both lines of
authority is that the Court acts best when it has clear and workable
rules, rooted in constitutionally anchored democratic principles, that
directly advance the political rights of citizens.
The Court’s masterpiece intervention to correct a systemic dem-
ocratic failure of the political braches came in the 1960s when it
struck down malapportioned congressional and state legislative
districts. The Court declared the imperative of a one-person, one-
vote redistricting standard in the landmark cases of Baker v.
Carr,124 Wesberry v. Sanders,125 and Reynolds v. Sims.126 In these
magnificent decisions, the Court found justiciable the pervasive
problem of malapportioned legislative districts and struck down
absurdly lopsided ratios in the internal populations of congressional,
state legislative, county, and city council districts in the states.127 In
Reynolds, decided in 1964, the Court replaced Alabama’s state
legislative district imbalances of up to 41:1 with a bright-line
requirement of equally populated 1:1 districts.128 Chief Justice
Warren declared that “[l]egislators represent people, not trees or
acres,” and “[l]egislators are elected by voters, not farms or cities or
economic interests.”129 Population must be the “controlling consid-
eration” in redistricting, and districts must be “as nearly as prac-
ticable, districts of equal population.”130 This bright-line formula
transformed the landscape of American representative democracy
with a simple formula: one person, one vote, so all votes equal.
This was a stunningly controversial move that must be under-
stood in the context of the nation’s civil rights awakening at the
time. One person, one vote did not exist judicially prior to Reynolds
v. Sims, and the dissenters in that decision attacked the allegedly
124. 369 U.S. 186, 207-08 (1962).
125. 376 U.S. 1, 17-18 (1964).
126. 377 U.S. 533, 565-66, 568-69 (1964).
127. See id.; 369 U.S. at 207-08.
128. 377 U.S. at 545, 565-66.
129. Id. at 562.
130. Id. at 534, 581.
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aggressive judicial activism of the Court’s majority.131 When the
Court adopted it, the one-person, one-vote standard was unthink-
ably radical and it undoubtedly capsized American politics by
uplifting masses of marginalized and disenfranchised people over
the Jim Crow political masters of the redistricting process. It was
the irreducible clarity of one person, one vote that made this sweep-
ing judicial intervention into American politics not only a readily
workable proposition in federal district courts across the land, but
also a dramatic and well-internalized success at every level of gov-
ernment.
The development of the one-person, one-vote idea drew heavily on
the political struggle of the civil rights movement and the experi-
ence of African Americans. Chief Justice Warren described Reynolds
v. Sims as one of his finest decisions, bitterly controversial though
it was both on and off the Court. As a practical matter, it ended the
artificially inflated hegemony of conservative rural interests in
many states, destroying the malapportioned “rotten boroughs” of
American politics. As a matter of American constitutional philoso-
phy, the Court’s new formula rested on a self-evident political and
moral truth that mathematician and Student Nonviolent Coordinat-
ing Committee (SNCC) master organizer Bob Moses would come to
call a “radical equation.”132 As they went from door to door on the
sweltering country roads of Mississippi registering African Ameri-
cans to vote in the early 1960s, Moses and other SNCC organizers
coined the “one-person, one-vote” phrase to counter the idea they
encountered at the doors that voting was “white man’s business.”133
This powerful organizing axiom distilled the existential commit-
ment in the civil rights movement that each and every person in a
state must have an equal vote and an equal voice if democracy is to
be a living reality rather than a cynical alibi for white supremacy.
Through acts of nearly incomprehensible physical and moral cour-
age in the most dangerous hamlets of police violence and KKK
terror, Moses and SNCC—along with assassinated colleagues like
Mickey Schwerner, James Chaney, and Andrew Goodman—tore
down the literacy test, the white primary, and the polling-place
131. Id. at 589 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
132. See ROBERT P. MOSES & CHARLES E. COBB, JR., RADICAL EQUATIONS: CIVIL RIGHTS
FROM MISSISSIPPI TO THE ALGEBRA PROJECT 68-70 (2001). 
133. See id.
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constitutional exam,134 making way for the Voting Rights Act of
1965.135 These civil rights heroes made the radical equation of
democracy—one person, one vote—come alive in the Supreme Court
and throughout American politics.
But the Warren Court’s dramatic success in the one-person, one-
vote era contrasts with the Rehnquist Court’s trek through the
political thicket to slash away at the phantom called “racial gerry-
mandering.” Nothing better proves the dangers of adopting a per-
vasively subjective and essentially aesthetic method of determining
the constitutionality of legislative districts than the Shaw v. Reno
(Shaw I )136 line of decisions. The Court, on a 5-4 basis, repeatedly
struck down majority-minority districts (and, of course, no majority-
white districts) for being “bizarrely shaped” or having a “predomi-
nant racial purpose,” whatever these mysterious and conclusory
labels might mean to the Justices.
In these cases, the conservatives drew on their psychic powers—
like Justice Potter Stewart channeling obscene art and litera-
ture—and essentially said they knew the obscenity of racial
gerrymandering when they saw it on a redistricting map.137 In
Shaw, the 5-4 majority upheld the justiciability of claims by Duke
University professor Robinson Everett and other white voters that
their Equal Protection rights were violated when North Carolina,
after the 1990 reapportionment and for the first time since Recon-
struction, drew two new majority-African American districts (out of
twelve), finding their perimeter lines “uncouth” and “bizarre.”138
Justice O’Connor respectfully recapitulated the whites’ nonsensical
racial complaint: “What appellants object to is redistricting legis-
lation that is so extremely irregular on its face that it rationally can
be viewed only as an effort to segregate the races for purposes of
voting, without regard for traditional districting principles.”139 Thus,
the Court’s conservative majority, already in full backlash mode
over affirmative action and other race-conscious remedies, embraced
134. See id.
135. Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437 (codified as amended at 52
U.S.C. §§ 10301-10702 (Supp. III 2016))
136. 509 U.S. 630 (1993).
137. See id. 509 U.S. at 646-47.
138. Id. at 677.
139. Id. at 642.
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and deployed a totally intuitive subjective standard, rooted in its
own haughty aesthetic reactions, to declare that certain majority-
African American and Hispanic districts presumptively violate the
Equal Protection Clause.140
This astounding decision marked a radical break from logic and
precedent and transplanted a racial double standard into the very
heart of Equal Protection Clause jurisprudence. The Court had
never before imposed on majority-white districts aesthetic constitu-
tional standards or any equal protection expectations for district
shape, compactness, or the gracefulness of district lines. Indeed,
there were majority-white districts in the 1990 North Carolina plan
that looked even more bizarre and convoluted than the majority-
non-white districts that were targeted for destruction. Moreover,
Justice O’Connor’s repeated invocation of “segregat[ion]”141 and even
“political apartheid”142 to describe these new districts gave the game
away because, however “uncouth” they seemed, they were the most
closely integrated districts in North Carolina history. Both the First
District and the Twelfth District had “voting-age populations that
are approximately 53 percent black [and] 45 percent white.”143 Be-
fore redistricting, out of the twelve members of North Carolina’s
U.S. House delegation, there were no African Americans and, in-
deed, there had been none since 1899.144 But in 1992, after the redis-
tricting, Eva Clayton won in the First District,145 becoming the first
African American woman ever to reach Congress from the state.
Additionally, Mel Watt prevailed in the Twelfth District, becoming
not only one of the first two African Americans to serve in Congress
from North Carolina in a century,146 but a passionate voice for North
Carolina’s long-suppressed progressive voters.
140. Id. at 658.
141. Id. at 642, 651-52.
142. Id. at 647.
143. Brief for the Congressional Black Caucus as Amicus Curiae Supporting Appellees at
23, Shaw v. Hunt (Shaw II), 509 U.S. 630 (1995) (Nos. 94-923, 94-924), 1995 WL 702802.
144. See Black-American Representatives and Senators by State and Territory, 1870-
Present, U.S. HOUSE REPRESENTATIVES: HIST., ART & ARCHIVES, http://history.house.gov/
Exhibitions-and-Publications/BAIC/Historical-Data/Black-American-Representatives-and-
Senators-by-State-and-Territory/ [https://perma.cc/83HX-NCSV].
145. See Clayton, Eva M., U.S. HOUSE REPRESENTATIVES: HIST., ART & ARCHIVES, http://
history.house.gov/People/Detail/11065 [https://perma.cc/XJ2M-JTP9].
146. See Watt, Melvin L., U.S. HOUSE REPRESENTATIVES: HIST., ART & ARCHIVES, http://
history.house.gov/People/Detail/23463 [https://perma.cc/WG3W-U92A].
34
William & Mary Law Review Online, Vol. 59 [2018], Art. 7
https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmlronline/vol59/iss1/7
2018] IDENTIFYING THE WORST GERRYMANDERS 161
Mesmerized by appearances and constitutionally forgetful (at
best), the majority in Shaw v. Reno never asked whether the pur-
pose behind the design of majority-African American districts was
to discriminate against white voters. This stiff “purpose require-
ment” has been a fast-acting guillotine used to decapitate Equal
Protection Clause lawsuits by minority plaintiffs challenging fa-
cially neutral laws. Thus, the Court rejected challenges brought by
African Americans to: a personnel exam which Black applicants
disproportionately failed;147 the use of at-large winner-take-all elec-
tions that consistently thwarted Black political aspirations;148 and
state death penalty regimes in which the murderers of white victims
are more than four times more likely to be executed than the mur-
derers of African Americans or Hispanics.149 In all these cases of
patently lopsided racial disadvantage and inequality, the minority
plaintiffs lost because, as the Court put it in Mobile v. Bolden, “only
if there is purposeful discrimination can there be a violation of the
Equal Protection Clause.”150
Not only did the Shaw Court fail to ask whether the purpose of
creating a majority-African American district was to discriminate
against white voters, it did not even require the white litigants to
show that the effect was discriminatory, a showing they plainly
could not have made. In the First and Twelfth House Districts of
North Carolina, white voters enjoyed every right Black voters had:
the right to vote, to run for office, to give and spend money, to peti-
tion their legislators, and so on. Of course, white voters had no right
to see that their preferred candidate win an election; but, this is a
right that no Black voter has ever dreamed of asserting, and it is
certainly not a right that is possible or even coherent within single-
member district, winner-take-all competitive elections in American
democracy.151
147. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 252 (1976).
148. City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 59-60, 71, 73 (1980) (plurality opinion).
149. McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 320 (1987) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
150. City of Mobile, 446 U.S. at 66-67. 
151. Furthermore, the Court in the Shaw cases completely suspended its general insistence
that Equal Protection Clause litigants demonstrate that they have constitutional “standing”
to bring their claims, which means making a showing that they have been concretely injured
in a way that is traceable to the government and redressable by judicial action. See generally
Shaw I, 509 U.S. 630 (1993). The Shaw plaintiffs could simply show no “concrete, parti-
cularized” injury because they lost no political right unless it was the right, cherished but
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But the conservative Court and lower federal courts have struck
down numerous majority-minority districts under the Shaw/Miller
line of cases, almost always leaning heavily on impressionistic
judgments about contorted line-drawing. These cases have been an
intellectual embarrassment at every level, imposing a naked racial
double standard in the name of equal protection and causing po-
litical and administrative nightmares in the states. Shaw cases are
only slowly subsiding now as the conservatives who originally
brought them have decided to exchange their ideological fervor for
denouncing quota districts152 and political Bantustans153 for the
strategic partisan advantages of packing as many African American
voters as possible into as few districts as possible. In other words,
“political apartheid” has gone from being a rhetorical constitutional
bludgeon that conservatives use in court against redistricting plans
favorable to Black political empowerment, to being a conscious
strategy that conservatives employ in state legislatures for packing
a handful of districts with maximum numbers of African American
voters to “bleach” all the others and racialize the two parties. Today,
in the states of the former Confederacy,154 the Republican Party is
effectively the white party and the Democratic Party is effectively
the African American party.155 There are four southern white Dem-
ocrats in the U.S. Senate156 and only one of these is from what
colloquially known as the “Deep South.”157 Moreover, there are only
carefully unspoken, for white voters to be guaranteed a white representative. See id. This
apparently deeply-felt right reflects nostalgia for white supremacy but is perfectly incoherent
in a multiracial political democracy where all citizens will presumably be represented at some
level—from the White House to the local school board—by someone who does not share our
“race.” Cf. id. at 641-42.
152. See Holder v. Hall, 512 U.S. 874, 905-06 (1994) (Thomas, J., concurring) (describing
district lines as drawn to ensure the existence of the appropriate number of minority seats).
153. See id.
154. The Confederacy included Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, Missis-
sippi, North Carolina, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, and Virginia. See Confederate States
of America, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, https://www.britannica.com/topic/Confederate-States-
of-America [https://perma.cc/K4NK-MMGC].
155. See, e.g., Party Affiliation Among Adults in Virginia by Race/Ethnicity, PEW RES.
CTR. (2014), http://www.pewforum.org/religious-landscape-study/compare/party-affiliation/by/
[https://perma.cc/JW8W-5AR6]; see also infra note 161 and accompanying text. 
156. See Our Caucus, U.S. SENATE DEMOCRATIC CAUCUS, https://www.democrats.senate.
gov/about-senate-dems/our-caucus [https://perma.cc/76K8-SFNE] (Doug Jones (Ala.); Bill
Nelson (Fla.); Tim Kaine, Mark Warner (Va.)).
157. The election of Democrat Doug Jones to the U.S. Senate from Alabama by a robust
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thirteen southern white Democrats left in U.S. House seats, with
five of these coming from southern Florida.158 Every Deep South
legislature has a white Republican majority159 while African
Americans are overwhelmingly supportive of the Democratic
Party160 and have been reduced to a permanent political minority in
Dixie. There is not a single African American chair of a legislative
committee in all the states of the former Confederacy today.
There are not many people motivated to bring Shaw claims
anymore, except African Americans themselves: the plaintiffs in Al-
abama Legislative Black Caucus v. Alabama understood that their
votes are being traduced and diluted through the cynical “packing”
process underway in redistricting throughout the South.161 Although
the Voting Rights Act of 1965 has been dismembered by the Su-
preme Court, the Court still has this incoherent “racial gerry-
mandering” cause of action lying about, and the plaintiffs shrewdly
seized upon it to see whether they could move the Court to act. How
the Roberts Court ultimately responds in the Alabama case is
anyone’s guess, but the Rehnquist Court’s disgraceful 5-4 perfor-
mance in Bush v. Gore in 2000 suggests that strategic partisan
considerations are likely to trump professed conservative ideolo-
gy (federalism, respect for the political branches, and judicial
interracial political coalition in a special election is a promising but singular event: he was
opposing Judge Roy Moore, a religious and ideological extremist who had been credibly
accused of sexual predation toward teenaged girls. See Alexander Burns & Jonathan Martin,
Once a Long Shot, Democrat Doug Jones Wins Alabama Senate Race, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 12,
2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/12/12/us/politics/alabama-senate-race-winner.html
[https://perma.cc/4574-HU8N]. 
158. See Our Members, U.S. HOUSE DEMOCRATS, http://www.dems.gov/members/ [https://
perma.cc/4DYG-6ZBV] (Kathy Castor, Charlie Crist, Ted Deutch, Lois Frankel, Debbie
Wasserman (Fla.); David E. Price (N.C.); Steve Cohen, Jim Cooper (Tenn.); Lloyd Doggett,
Gene Green, Beto O’Rourke (Tex.); Don Beyer, Gerry Connolly (Va.)).
159. See Legislator Demographics, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES, http://www.ncsl.org/
research/about-state-legislatures/who-we-elect-an-interactive-graphic.aspx# [https://perma.cc/
3LTS-E456] (follow “PDF: Download Table for Race/Ethnicity” hyperlink under “Additional
Resources”) (Alabama—75%; Arkansas—88%; Florida—70%; Georgia—72%; Louisiana—76%;
Mississippi—71%; North Carolina—79%; South Carolina—76%; Tennessee—85%; Texas—
65%; Virginia—83%).
160. See Exit Polls, CNN (2016), https://www.cnn.com/election/2016/results/exit-polls
[https://perma.cc/2NSE-GK2Y]; How Groups Voted in 2012, ROPER CTR., https://ropercenter.
cornell.edu/polls/us-elections/how-groups-voted/how-groups-voted-2012/ [https://perma.cc/
8BUM-YJSQ]; How Groups Voted in 2004, ROPER CTR., https://ropercenter.cornell.edu/polls/
us-elections/how-groups-voted/how-groups-voted-2004/ [https://perma.cc/F2EQ-MR7F]. 
161. See 988 F. Supp. 2d 1285, 1291 (M.D. Ala. 2013).
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restraint).162 Because the Justices know unlawful racial gerryman-
dering only when they see it, and given that it is no longer in the
majority’s interests to find it, it is unlikely they are going to “see” it
for much longer anywhere. The Roberts Court may be concluding
that it is time to slowly retire the flabby subjective standard, as its
political utility may be exhausted.
But the doctrine itself, arbitrary and incoherent to the core,
ideologically charged and tinged with the history of political white
supremacy, demonstrates the complete malleability and plasticity
of aesthetic approaches to dissecting the awesome exercise of po-
litical power embodied in legislative redistricting. Citizens need
stronger rules and more precise standards.
CONCLUSION
There is no political movement in the country today challenging
gerrymandering the way the civil rights movement challenged Jim
Crow and racial disenfranchisement, but there is a widely felt dis-
enchantment with the dynamics of the redistricting process and
growing efforts in various states to move to something less manip-
ulative and autocratic. At the same time, conservatives on the Su-
preme Court may undercut these political efforts as they seek to
dismantle independent redistricting commissions, which are the in-
stitutional actors that have opened up some political space to imag-
ine alternatives to the gerrymandering regime.
This possibility makes it all the more important to refocus the
Court and the country on a real constitutional pathway through the
gerrymander system. In order to spell out discernable and workable
judicial standards for invalidating partisan gerrymanders, these
standards must be clear, precise, and workable. Otherwise, the
standards can simply become another magnet for political and
racialized tactics, and then serve as the pretext for the kind of
slanted, partisan, and ideological actions undertaken by the Court
in the Shaw line of cases.
But the crisis of political democracy that partisan gerryman-
dering has caused is deepening. The advent of finely tuned com-
puter redistricting software enables state legislative majorities to
162. See generally 531 U.S. 98 (2000) (per curiam).
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maximize their legislative seats by packing voters of the other party
into a few extremely safe districts, thereby “wasting” as many of
their votes as possible in lopsided districts and leaving them a
hopeless minority in all the others. In the masterpiece congressional
gerrymanders, the ruling party actually draws the lines and stacks
the deck in such a way as to run the table and fence out the other
party completely, leaving their voters with no U.S. House seats at
all (as Democrats have done to Republicans in Massachusetts163 and
Republicans to Democrats in Oklahoma).164 This practice constitutes
a form of egregious political viewpoint discrimination found right at
the heart of the electoral process and in the structuring of a gov-
ernmental nonpublic forum: the state’s congressional delegation.
Similarly, the advanced technology of redistricting sometimes
empowers the party in control in the state capital to engineer a
majority in the state’s congressional delegation, even if its oppo-
nents won a majority of votes for Congress in the last election. This
role reversal upsets the proper alignment of forces under the
Twelfth Amendment, which makes the state’s congressional del-
egation a formal and significant constitutional actor that must
speak for the state in contingent presidential elections. The political
majority must have a delegation majority, or at least a tie, if the
Twelfth Amendment and Equal Protection Clause are to be re-
spected.
The Court has been unable to tease out of Equal Protection
Clause doctrine alone any discernable, workable, or manageable
standards for addressing even the most severe and egregious par-
tisan gerrymanders. Thus, it is time to consider the Twelfth Amend-
ment and First Amendment forum doctrine in order to introduce
two compelling and workable definitions for the most extreme kinds
of partisan gerrymanders, and to establish bright-line standards
for how to replace them.
If the Court were to strike down some of these blatant cases of
minority usurpation or fencing out, it would force the states to
change the way they do business. It would also open up impressive
space for political movements and citizens to call for the kinds of
proportional remedies and systems that Justice Thomas discussed
163. See supra notes 78-79 and accompanying text.
164. See supra note 75 and accompanying text.
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in his concurring opinion in Holder v. Hall.165 Democracy is stag-
nating under the weight of partisan gerrymandering. U.S. politics
needs new voices and new choices and to dramatically enhance the
representativeness and competitiveness of elections. The Court can
begin by striking down the most egregious partisan gerrymanders
in the country, those in which a popular minority abuses the re-
districting process to lock down a majority in the House delegation,
and those in which the dominant party completely excludes and
effaces the voice of its partisan opposition.
165. See Holder v. Hall, 512 U.S. 874, 909-11 (1994) (Thomas, J., concurring) (“As some
Members of the Court have already recognized, geographic districting is not a requirement
inherent in our political system.”); see also Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 159 (1986)
(O’Connor, J., concurring) (“Districting itself represents a middle ground between winner-
take-all statewide elections and proportional representation for political parties.”).
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